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Abstract
We study e cient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for ad-hoc net-
works via the prism of IPv6-enabled Wireless Sensor Actuator Networks. These networks
consist of highly constrained devices able to communicate wirelessly in an ad-hoc fashion,
thus following the architecture of ad-hoc networks. Current state-of-the-art (IDS) has been
developed taking into consideration the architecture of conventional computer networks,
and as such they do not e ciently address the paradigm of ad-hoc networks, that is highly
relevant in emergent networks, such as the Internet of Things (IoT). In this context, the
network properties of resilience and redundancy have not been studied yet. In this work,
we firstly identify a trade-o↵ between the communication overhead and energy consumption
of an IDS (as captured by the number of active IDS agents in the network) and the perfor-
mance of the system in terms of successfully identifying attacks. In order to fine tune this
trade-o↵, we model such networks as Random Geometric Graphs; a rigorous approach that
allows us to capture underlying structural properties of the network. We then introduce a
novel IDS architectural approach that consists of a central IDS agent a set of distributed
IDS agents deployed uniformly at random over the network area. These nodes are able
to e ciently detect attacks at the networking layer in a collaborative manner by monitor-
ing locally available network information provided by IoT routing protocols such as RPL.
Our detailed experimental evaluation demonstrates significant performance gains in terms
of communication overhead and energy consumption while maintaining high detection rates.
We also show that the performance of our IDS in ad-hoc networks does not rely on the size of
the network but on fundamental underling network properties, such as the network topology
and the average degree of the nodes. Conducted experiments show that our proposed IDS
architecture is resilient against frequent topology changs due to nodes failures.
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1. Introduction
Internet of Things represents an emerging networking paradigm both in qualitative and
quantitative terms. Following previous paradigm shifts - such as Web 2.0, Cloud Computing
and the rise of Social Media - that enabled computers and people to be interconnected, now
things and machines are able to seamlessly exchange information and data over the Internet.
The profound impact of IoT is highlighted by the number of IoT devices being deployed,
as well as the projected growth of the corresponding market; a number of studies predict
that by 2025 more than 55 billion IoT devices will be deployed and around 15USD trillion
will be invested in IoT in aggregate between 2017 and 2025 [16]. Furthermore, IoT has found
its way to several verticals such as healthcare, manufacturing and critical infrastructure[14].
The importance and critical role of IoT in the modern economy has naturally made such
systems targets of malicious activity, such as the infamous Mirai botnet[11] or the case
where hackers were able to a↵ect the steering and braking systems of a Jeep car[28]. It
is worth noting that IoT networks and systems are not only the subjects of but also the
means for deploying attacks (such as in the case of Mirai). Ironically, the deployment of
such attacks has also been facilitated - among other factors - by the use of standardised
Internet technologies that have enabled the paradigm in the first place.
Broadly speaking, security controls can be taxonomized in three layers. At the first
layer (also known as the first line of defence) lie preventative countermeasures, such as
authentication and access control mechanisms, cryptography , firewalls, and so forth. At
the second layer (also known as the second line of defence) lie detection countermeasures
that are engaged during an attack, such as Intrusion Detection Systems. Finally, at the last
layer lie recovery measures and processes for post-incident management, such as triaging,
security information incident management and digital forensics. Due to the inherent and
particular characteristics of IoT (i.e. highly constrained, deployed in mass numbers and their
ephemeral availability), the corresponding cyber security measures need to be revisited.
A considerable amount of research has been carried out in Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) concerning deployment architectures, detection strategies and algorithms. However,
currently available IDS are designed for “traditional” computer networks, thus making strong
assumptions about the system the IDS will be deployed in; e.g. that each node of the network
is powerful in terms of resources, is always available and that the nodes communicate over a
reliable and high-capacity network. As such, there is a need for innovative, lightweight IDS
that will e ciently address the IoT paradigm.
Our contributions. A wireless sensor actuator network (WSAN) consists of a set of
small and inexpensive autonomous devices deployed over an area of interest. The devices
- commonly referred to as motes or simply sensors - are able to wirelessly communicate
with their peers and, in spite of their highly constrained nature, to collaboratively carry
out complex tasks. WSNs are a key enabling technology for the IoT and as such share
several common characteristics. For the same reason, WSNs have provided an ideal R&D
platform for several IoT protocols and technologies, such as the CoAP [30], 6LoWPAN [29]
and 6TiSCH [5]. In this work we study e cient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems
for IoT deployments via the prism of IPv6-enabled WSNs.
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Firstly, we model a WSN with the use of Random Geometric Graphs (RGG). The RGG
model e ciently captures spatial characteristics of the network that are closely related to
network connectivity; e.g. inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless links among neigh-
bouring nodes. Then, motivated by how IoT networking protocols, such as RPL, manage
and operate the network, we identify inherent trade-o↵s between the communication over-
head introduced by an IDS and its detection rate of attacks such as the sinkhole attack.
We investigate this trade-o↵ via extended emulations and show there exists an underlying
threshold behaviour in the e ciency of the IDS that is related to the connectivity threshold
of the RGG model. This allows us to conjure that in peer-to-peer IoT networks, the number
of IDS agents that need to be deployed in order to achieve a high detection rate is constant
and a function of the ratio between the network area size and the communication range of
the nodes. Furthermore, we show that the proposed architecture is able to e ciently cope
with and mitigate the e↵ects of nodes failures on the the e ciency of the IDS.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the current state-of-
the-art with a special emphasis on the most important contributions in Intrusion Detection
Systems in WSNs. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the proposed network model and adopted
IDS architecture based on Random Geometric Graphs. Section 5 presents the performance
evaluation of the proposed approach and discusses the simulation results and findings. In
section 6, we introduce possible directions and extensions for future research that are derived
upon the contributions of this research. Finally, conclusions are discussed in section 7.
2. Related Work
IDS for WSNs and the IoT have attracted significant research interest in the past years;
in this section we focus on the most important contributions in the area. Coarsely speak-
ing, IDSs can be classified based on their architecture into systems following a centralized,
distributed or a hybrid architecture. In centralized IDSs, all relevant monitoring and detec-
tion information has to be reported to a centrally located base station where sophisticated
detection algorithms are executed. Here, the base station is considered powerful in terms of
processing capabilities and available memory and energy. On the other hand, in distributed
architectures each individual network node is running an IDS agent and in cooperation with
other agents in the network, they collaboratively detect any on-going attacks. Finally, hybrid
IDS architectures demonstrate a combination of the centralized and distributed architectures
in an e↵ort to exploit and combine the advantages of each individual approach.
2.1. Centralized IDS Architectures
In [19], authors proposed a detection method for WSNs that aggregates the functions
of the IDS with those of the intrusion prevention system. In this approach, symmetric
encryption and one–way hash functions are used to establish the routing path between the
base station (BS) and other nodes of the network. Their results showed that their approach
reduces the total amount of required energy, in some cases quite significantly. However, this
comes at a cost of increased computational overhead due to the use of a symmetric key.
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In [18], authors proposed an IDS for IoT named Kalis. Kalis is placed at the border
router to collect features of the network and use these to dynamically configure appropriate
detection techniques. The authors claim that this approach can be applied and extended to
new protocols as it is a protocol independent method being based on features.
In [10] authors proposed a centralised IDS for IoT. They introduced Complex Event-
Processing (CEP) techniques to monitor network packets that is placed at the router bor-
der.Their approach is a specification-based IDS relies on stored rules in Rules Pattern Repos-
itory using SQL and EPL.The experiment result reveals that their approach had increased
the computation overhead and consumed less memory comparing with traditional IDS .
2.2. Distributed Architecture IDSs
In [12], authors proposed a distributed anomaly detection framework for industrial WSNs
that uses in-network hierarchical processing. The nodes of the network are first clustered
using fuzzy c-means clustering, and then run an incremental model to score local and global
outliers. The proposed method was evaluated both on synthetic and real data and results
showed a better trade-o↵ to be achieved between achieving high-accuracy and introducing
a smaller computational and communication overhead to the network.
In [17], authors proposed a lightweight IDS for WSNs that combines anomaly-based
detection (using support vector machine algorithms) with signature based rules. The authors
study cluster-based topologies that reduce communication costs thus leading to extending
the network lifetime. Simulation results show that their proposed model can detect abnormal
events e ciently and has a high detection rate with a lower false-alarm rate.
In [34], authors proposed an energy-e cient location-aware clone detection protocol in
densely deployed WSNs, which can guarantee successful clone attack detection and maintain
satisfactory network lifetime. Their approach is based on Specification Protocol Analysis
that exploits location information of sensors to verify the legitimacy of other sensors in the
proximity and detect clone attacks. Simulation results showed that this approach yielded
high accuracy in detecting clone attacks and relatively lower energy consumption compared
to other approaches.
In [4], authors proposed a distributed anomaly detection method for WSNs that uses
both signature and anomaly-based detection techniques. Their framework is composed of
a central agent and a number of local agents. The central agent employs data mining
detection techniques whereas the local agents uses lighter detection techniques. Decision
trees have been adopted as classification algorithm in the detection process of the central
agent and their behaviour has been analysed in selected attacks scenarios. The empirical
results revealed that this method exhibits low detection accuracy and high false positive
rates.
In [33], authors proposed a segment-based anomaly detection method to detect anoma-
lies in WSNs. This algorithm has combined the Distributed Segment-Based and Kull-
back–Leibler divergence measures and distributed the sensor nodes in clusters and each
cluster has cluster head node. The algorithm is executed separately by each cluster head
node and main nodes. This method was evaluated using a real-world data set and the result
had revealed a high performance and low communication costs. However, this proposed
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detection method limited to hierarchical network and my applied for flat network with addi-
tional requirements. And also it assumes static architecture that does not consider frequent
dynamic changes of WSN.
In [8], authors proposed a distributed IDS for IoT. Their detection module is installed
at each node, which monitors and detects attacks using a statistical analysis tool based
on Binary Logistic Regression (BLR). Their results show that this approach yielded high
accuracy in detecting attacks, but relatively high energy consumption compared to other
approaches.
In [15], authors proposed a distributed IDS following blockchain model. They developed
a blockchain-based framework called CBSigIDS by combining blockchains with distributed
signature-based IDS in IoT. Blockchain- based IDSs in IoT are in the infancy stage, authors
highlight several issues with this approach. Further researches are needed to investigate the
e ciency and e↵ectiveness of blockchain distribution.
In [3], authors proposed a distributed IDS on 6LoWPAN called (INTI) for IoT. INTI
is a distributed IDS combines trust and reputation concepts in which each node monitors
exchange packet with neighbour nodes. In their approach, nodes are classified into leader,
association and member nodes following hierarchical or cluster based network structure,
also the node’s category can be changed over the time due attack occurrence or network
reconfiguration. When a node detects an attack, a broadcast alert is sent to other nodes in
the networks. The performance and e↵ectiveness of this approach were not presented.
In [32], authors had proposed a cluster-based detection approach for WSNs that consists
of three di↵erent IDS agents for sink node, cluster head and sensor node. Each agent is
designed based on the capability of node that is designed for in order to exploit the ad-
vantages of distributing the detection e↵orts over all nodes. Additionally, they used hybrid
detection technique that combine rule-based with back- propagation network (BPN) to de-
tect anomalies. The simulation results showed that the proposed approach achieved low
resource consumption in some cases; however the proposed BPN anomaly detection tech-
nique is not accurate enough to minimize the false positive alarm. This approach consists of
three di↵erent IDS agents that increase the complexity of detection mechanism and increase
the communication overhead.
In [20], authors proposed a distributed signature-based detection system for IoT. In their
approach, each single node in charge of monitoring the network tra c extracts the packet
payloads in order to reduce unnecessary matching to reduce the computational overhead.
The adopted detection algorithm in each node matches against conventional attacks signa-
tures in Snort. Their detection approach may detect attacks faster than other algorithms,
but only detects known conventional attacks.
2.3. Hybrid Architecture IDSs
In [24]authors introduced a detection method that uses misuse and anomaly detection
techniques to detect sinkhole and deprivation attacks in WSNs. This method provisions local
agents that are installed in each wireless sensor node as well as a central detection agent
deployed at the base station. The local IDS agents are responsible for analysing tra c flow
handled by the local node, gathering control data and sending it to the central agent. With
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such an arrangement local nodes are able to detect suspicious activities and to collaboratively
contribute to the global detection process. The authors evaluated their approach through
simulations and noted that a high detection rate can be achieved. However, the proposed
approach does not consider the highly-constraint nature of WSN and the limitations it poses
on real-life systems.
In [27] the authors introduced an IDS for WSN that follows a hybrid architecture. Their
solution focuses on routing attacks and consists of a central IDS module (running computa-
tionally intensive processes) that runs on the Sink node and a lightweight distributed agent
that is deployed on sensor motes. The proposed IDS has three main modules: a central mod-
ule called mapper, a lightweight intrusion detection module and a firewall. The proposed
solution shows a good performance in small networks, but it introduces a massive commu-
nication overhead in larger networks. This is mainly due to the fact that the lightweight
agent is deployed on every single sensor mote of the network, thus leading to bottleneck
phenomena to emerge around the Sink as the diameter of the network increases.
In [13] the authors proposed a specification-based intrusion detection system for IoT
to detect attacks on RPL-based networks. Their approach leverages a hybrid and partially
distributed architecture that divides the network into clusters where each cluster has a cluster
head. The distributed IDS agents are placed on the cluster heads to monitor member nodes
within their cluster. And then, each cluster head reports all relevant detection information
to the central IDS that is placed on base station. The simulation results revealed that their
approach achieved high detection rate and low overhead. However, this proposed IDS is
limited to cluster based networks.
In [23] the authors proposed a hybrid intrusion detection system for IoT consisting of
central and distributed IDS agents. The centralised IDS agent was placed on the border
router and the distributed IDS agent is equipped with other network nodes. The distributed
IDS agents are in charge to monitor their neighbour nodes and report to the central IDs
in the sink node. The simulation result showed that their approach achieved low energy
consumption and high detection rate, but still limited to small sized networks.
In [31], authors proposed a hybrid IDS for IoT by extending [27]. They extended the
detection module of SVELTE by using ETX(Expected Transmissions) metric with the de-
tection process. Moreover, they proposed detection methods with geographical information
to detection malicious nodes that attempt to attack ETX based networks. Their evaluation
experiment revealed that their approach achieved better detection rates. However, they
evaluated their approach in small networks with few nodes.
The current state-of-the-art on IDSs for WSN and IoT networks are still resource-
intensive and do not seem to adequately address the highly constrained nature of the under-
lying devices. Centralised IDS architectures introduce significant communication overheads
to the network as the base station (also known as Sink) injects and receives large numbers
of requests to and from the nodes related to IDS data collection. Moreover, in the special
case of multi-hop peer-to-peer networks, bottleneck e↵ect phenomena emerge in the areas
close to the Sink as the corresponding nodes relay data from/to the rest of the network. Dis-
tributed IDS architectures largely rely on the cooperation between the sensor nodes, thus
increasing the communication load as well as energy dissipation. Lastly, hybrid IDS archi-
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tectures achieve a better control and global overview of the network, but currently available
solutions also introduce a significant communication overhead that increases proportionally
to the number of network nodes. To the best of our knowledge, the subject of resilience
of the IDS architecture has not yet been extensively investigated in current-state-of-the-art
IDS in WSNs and IoT.
A possible solution to overcome these challenges is to use a hybrid architecture which
combines centralised and distributed IDS agents thus avoiding the disadvantages of cen-
tralised and distributed architectures. Hybrid architecture would provide better control
of the IDS architecture since the centralised IDS agent is more powerful and rich in re-
sources that are able to perform more complex algorithms and processes. Furthermore, a
hybrid architecture placement scheme may reduce the communication overheads and en-
ergy consumption associated with the detection processes and the communication between
base station and nodes when it is integrated with partly distributed architecture. We use
Graph theory to design our solution in order to properly solve the particular characteristics
of the IoT and Wireless Sensor Network paradigms. The proposed system aims to address
the following characteristics of IoT and WSN: their highly distributed nature; their ad-hoc
network structure; the peer-to-peer communication scheme among the devices; the highly
constrained nature of the devices per se in terms of resources (computational power, avail-
able energy, limited memory, etc). In particular, Random Graphs have been used as they
are a well-studied model and a paradigm for wireless networks, such as sensor networks.
Motes are represented as vertices in RGG, and the communication between these motes is
represented by the edges. Random Geometric Graph represents the actual placing of the
set of n vertices uniformly and randomly at the area of interest.
In this work we focus on hybrid IDS architectures but we show that by taking into
account the specifics of IoT protocols, such as the ranking mechanism of RPL, as well as the
spatial characteristics of such networks, the number of required IDS agents in the network
(and therefore the corresponding overhead) can be substantially reduced while maintaining
su ciently high detection rates.
3. The Network Model
The paradigm of IoT envisions the massive and seamless connection of embedded sys-
tems, smart devices and things over the Internet. Wireless Sensor & Actuator Networks
(WSANs) apart from being a key enabling technology many industrial applications, also
carry several characteristics that are typically found in several IoT systems. WSANs com-
prise of a big number of ultra-small sensor devices (which we also refer to as sensors), whose
purpose is to monitor local environmental conditions (e.g. ambient luminance, temperature,
etc.) and drive actuators (e.g. switches, valves, etc.). Each sensor is a fully-autonomous
computing and communication device, characterized mainly by its constrained nature in
terms of available power supply (battery), its transmission range r, the energy cost of data
transmission and the (limited) processing and memory capabilities. In this work we focus
our study on WSANs where the sensors are static and are deployed over the network area
uniformly at random.
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Proposed approach Detection technique Architecture Security Attacks Limitations/ Drawbacks
Moon et al. Signature Based centralized specific
Energy consumption,




distributed specific complex detection algorithm
Maleh et. Al
Anomaly based
distributed general Communication overhead,
Raza et al. Anomaly based Hybrid Routing attack Communication overhead
Kumarage et. al Anomaly based distributed general Communication overhead
Xie et. Al Anomaly based Hybrid specific Communication overhead within local cluster
Zhenge et. Al Specification protocol analysis distributed specific Cooperation between nodes increased Energy consumption
Xie et. al Anomaly based distributed general Limited to hierarchical networks
Wang et. Al Anomaly /Signature Based distributed specific Communication overhead
Ponomarchuk et. A Tra c analysis distributed general Communication overhead
Jun et al. Specification-based centralized general computation overhead, Communication overhead
le at al. Specification-based Hybrid Routing attack Limited to cluster based networks
Shreenivas et al Hybrid Hybrid Routing attack Communication overhead
Ponoglo et al. Anomaly based Hybrid Routing attack Limited to small size networks.
Cervantes et al Hybrid distributed Routing attack No details provided
Oh et al. Signature Based distributed conventional attacks Only detect known attacks
Ioannou et. al statistical analysis distributed Routing attack Energy consumption,
li et. al Signature Based distributed Flooding attacks Energy consumption, only detect known attacks,
Midi et. al Hybrid centralised DoS attack Energy consumption,
Table 1: Comparison of State-of-the-art IDSs
There is a special node within the network the called Sink S, that represents the gateway
device located on the edge of the WSAN network. In contrast to the WSAN nodes, the Sink
is assumed to be powerful in terms of computing power, memory and energy supply. It is
also the device that initiates the self-organisation of the network.
We consider that the random uniform placement of the sensors inside the network area
is abstracted by RGG as we had used in [1]. RGG is formed by n vertices that are placed
uniformly at random in the [0,1]2 square. An edge ( , ) exists i↵ the Euclidean distance
of vertices   and   is at most r, where r corresponds to the wireless communication radius
r of the sensors. This holds assuming a disc radio model; two sensors can communicate with
each other i↵ each one lies inside the communication range of the other. Random Geometric
Graphs also have an important nice property: unlike other random graphs, like Gn,p, edges
are not statistically independent of each other. That is, the existence of an edge ( , ) is not
independent of the existence of edges ( , ) and ( , ). This property makes RGG a quite
realistic model for WSANs as it captures to a great extent the communication structure of
real networks (at least their spatial aspects). For instance, in [2] authors employ the G(n;R)
model in order to study the performance of a new data collection strategy in WSN by mobile
sink. The same model can also be used to abstract emerging ad-hoc networks, such as WSNs
using 6TiSCH and IEEE 802.15.4e, that are very relevant to time synchronized industrial
networks [26], [25].
More formally, considering an area A ⇢ R2 in a two dimensional space, an instance of
the RGG model G(Xn; r) is constructed as follows: select n points Xn uniformly at random
in A. The set V = Xn is the set of vertices of the graph and we connect two vertices i↵
their euclidean distance is at most r. For any vertex   2 V we will denote by N( ) the set
of neighbours of   and by deg( ) = |N( )| its degree. Furthermore, we will denote by
k     k the Euclidean distance between the points corresponding to vertices  , 
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This way, the RGG model provides us with a formal tool of constructing and character-
ising networks as ”sparse”, ”dense” or ”normal”. We also later find that this threshold also
indicates the number of IDS agents needed in order to e ciently monitor a peer-to-peer,
ad-hoc wireless network.
Figure 1: The Proposed IDS Architecture
4. The Proposed IDS Architecture
We propose an IDS architecture consisting of a central detection agent located in the
base station and a distributed lightweight intrusion detection agent deployed on a subset of
the network nodes as shown in Figure 1. The central agent manages the entire detection
process and collects relevant data from the distributed agents. Each network node that runs
an instance of the distributed agent, monitors and collects data on local network activity
from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This implies that not all nodes need to run the IDS
agent, but only a subset of them such that every node in the network has at lest one 1-hop
neighbour running the IDS agent. In graph-theoretical terms, such a subset would be a
vertex cover of the corresponding RGG graph capturing the structure of the network. This
also implies that there exists a minimum set of nodes that are able to e ciently monitor
the network without compromising the performance of the IDS. This set corresponds to the
minimum vertex cover for the corresponding RGG graph.
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Algorithm 1 Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: M the list of IDS agents nodes
Require: N the list of Regular nodes
1: for Node in M do
2: for Node in N do
3: if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank





9: for Node in N do




Figure 2: loDetect Sinkhole Attacks
We apply the aforementioned approach on the state-of-the-art IDS for WSN by Raza et
al. called SVELTE [27]. In their work, the authors consider multi-hop peer-to-peer IPv6-
enabled WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack [29] on ContikiOS [6]. They develop an IDS
following a hybrid architecture that consists of a centralized module running on the Sink
and a distributed agent running on each individual sensor node. The centralized module
contains the 6LoWPAN Mapper (6Mapper) which is responsible for gathering information
from the sensor nodes on the network topology. In particular, 6Mapper collects information
on the rank assigned to each node by the RPL protocol (responsible for constructing and
maintaining a global tree-like network structure in a distributed manner) which is closely
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related to the hop distance of each node from the Sink. This allows a second component -
the intrusion detection component - to reconstruct and monitor the network topology for
anomalies that indicate an intrusion. For instance, a sinkhole attack could be deployed via
a compromised node by having this node falsely announcing to its neighbours a significantly
smaller rank. This would have its neighbouring nodes assume that its distance to the Sink
is much smaller than the actual one, thus directing all network tra c to go through the
compromised node.
Figure 3: Monitor the Distributed IDS Agents and Detect Sinkhole Attacks
As already mentioned, RPL establishes and maintains routing paths between the Sink
and the rest of the network nodes by constructing a global tree-like network structure in a
distributed way, the Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG). The process
is initiated by the Sink broadcasting exploratory messages to its immediate neighbouring
nodes, which in turn reiterate the process to their neighbouring nodes lying further away
in the network. The process is run recursively and eventually results in each node being
assigned a rank that depends on its actual hop-distance to the Sink as well as the link
quality between neighbouring nodes (as measured by an objective function, such as the
ETX metric). In SVELTE, the 6Mapper periodically collects these ranks to reconstruct
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the DODAG centrally at the Sink in order to monitor the network against relevant attacks
- like the sinkhole attack - by detecting corresponding anomalies as shown in Algorithm
1 lines 9 and 10, for example, checking if the rank of a node significantly deviates from
the rank of its neighbours. While for each individual node the introduced communication
overhead may be small (the messages carrying the 6Mapper requests are 5 bytes long while
each response from the nodes is 17 bytes long), engaging each individual node in the process
introduces a communication overhead that is proportional to the size of the network. This
poses significant scalability issues and adversely a↵ects the connectivity and availability of
the network as in multi-hop peer-to-peer networks nodes closer to the Sink also serve tra c
coming from the rest of the network.
Algorithm 2 Monitor the Distributed IDS Agents and Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: N the list of nodes
Require: M the list of selected nodes to run as IDS agents
Require: S the list of regular nodes
Require: M0  M
1: while M =   OR M 6= M0 do
2: while N 6=   do
3: Select a subset randomly to run as an IDS agent M ⇢ N
4: M0  M
5: S N   M
6: return A,A0, S
7: end while
8: end while
9: for Node in M do
10: for Node in S do
11: if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank





17: for Node in N do




They key idea behind our approach is that networking protocols designed to address
the distributed ad-hoc nature of peer-to-peer IoT networks (such as IPv6-enabled WSNs)
make use of network information that is locally available to the nodes, as in the case of
RPL. This network information can be easily shared with or even be monitored by 1-hop
neighbouring nodes (Algorithm 1 lines 1-5). Therefore, for a given set of neighbouring nodes
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it su ces that only one of them is actively collecting and reporting relevant information to
the Sink. This greatly reduces the number of nodes that need to operate as IDS agents, thus
mitigating any scalability and performance issues. Furthermore, we propose an algorithm
to select at random a subset of the nodes as shown in Algorithm 2 line 3 based on the
connectivity threshold, and also to maintain and monitor the distributed IDS agents against
node failures. The number of nodes in this subset should be equal to the connectivity
threshold where they are able to e ciently monitor the network and detect malicious nodes.
As expressed in Algorithm 2 line 1, the central IDS frequently checks the set of IDS agents
against node failures. Firstly, the central IDS constructs the network and then randomly
selects a subset of the node to perform the distributed IDS agent. In case where any of the
IDS nodes fail to communicate with the central IDS, the central IDS agent will re-run our
proposed algorithm to select at random a new subset of the nodes to act as IDS agents.
In this work, we focus on experimentally investigating and empirically evaluating our
approach using SVELTE as an indicative example of an IDS for ad-hoc networks. We
note that this choice is made without any loss of generality. In particular, we focus on
evaluating the trade-o↵ between the potentially reduced accuracy of the IDS in successfully
detecting attacks (due to the smaller number of active IDS agents in the network) versus
the reduced communication overhead and increased energy e ciency of the network. And
also, we evaluate the reliance and recovery of the proposed approach against nodes failure
to communicate the central IDS.
(a) 100% IDS agents (b) 60% IDS agents (c) 20% IDS agents
Figure 4: Indicative topology of sparse network in WSANs
5. Performance Evaluation
5.1. Simulation Set-Up
We ran our experiments using the Cooja emulator [21], which provides a detailed cross-
layer simulation for WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack. We ran our experiments in two
parts. Firstly, we evaluate the e ciency and e↵ectiveness of our proposed approach. Then,
we study the resilience and redundancy of the proposed architecture.
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(a) 100% IDS agents (b) 60% IDS agents (c) 20% IDS agents
Figure 5: Indicative topology of normal density network in WSANs
(a) 100% IDS agents (b) 60% IDS agents (c) 20% IDS agents
Figure 6: Indicative topology of dense network in WSANs
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 7: IDS detection rate against the number of active IDS agents in the network as percentage of the
node population. Notice that in normal density and dense networks the overhead induced by the IDS is that
high that the network gets disconnected prematurely.
We consider three qualitatively distinct network densities as these are indicated by the
RGG model. In particular, we consider a network areaA = [0,100]2 where n sensor motes
are deployed uniformly at random, for n 2 {32,64,128}. Following from equation 1, for
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each value of n, the corresponding network connectivity threshold is rc : {18.5; 14.3; 11}
respectively. Therefore, by setting the sensors’ communication range to be r = 20, we get
three network set ups where r is (a) almost equal to; (b) ⇥1.5 and (c)⇥2 the connectivity
threshold, thus resulting in (a) sparse, (b) normal and (c) dense networks. Figures 4, 5 and
6 provide a visual representation of the various network densities.
In the first part of our experiment, we consider five scenarios for each network density
where the percentage of nodes acting as IDS agents is 100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of the
total population (yellow nodes in the corresponding figures). Moreover, in each case we set
10% of the node population to act as malicious nodes (nodes in purple) deploying sinkhole
attacks by exploiting the rank mechanism of RPL. Any remaining nodes are regular nodes
(nodes in green).
Furthermore, for each network density in the second part of our experiment we consider
the number of IDS agents based on the connectivity threshold that we find later. The result
we found from the first experiment that the connectivity threshold indicates the number of
IDS agents needed to e ciently monitor the ad-hoc wireless network. The required number
of IDS agents in the network to achieve these levels of high detection rates is independent
of the network population and in fact constant. In the second part of our experiments, we
consider the number of IDS agents randomly placed in the network based on the connectivity
threshold which in our case is 25 IDS agents for all network densities n 2 {32,64,128}
and any remaining nodes are regular nodes. We gradually drop o↵ some nodes that perform
IDS agent during the simulation to evaluate the redundancy of our approach.
For each network configuration we also run a scenario with no nodes operating as IDS
nodes. For each scenario we create 10 random instances of the network; this allows us to
e↵ectively mitigate in our simulations any issues that might occur due to the random network
topology (in other words we sample the space of RGG instances). For each instance we run
10 iterations of simulating the network operation for a simulation time of 3600 seconds where
nodes generate and transmit data approximately every second. For each scenario and each
performance metric we compute the average values with 95% confidence intervals.
For all conducted experiments, we use Tmote Sky as it has been used widely in real-
wold systems. Thus, we followed the operation conditions of Tmote Sky provided by the
manufacturer to trace and calculate the energy consumption during the simulations.
Figure 8: Tmote Sky operation conditions [9]
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Etot   = Esen⇥0.0545mA + Ecp ⇥1.8mA + Etr nsm t⇥19.5mA+   sten⇥21.8mA (2)
E(mJ) =
Etot   ⇥ 3V





Our findings demonstrate strong concentration around the mean and are therefore deemed
statistically significant.
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 9: Energy consumption and communication overhead
for the entire network
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 10: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by the IDS
5.2. Evaluation Metrics
In the following subsections we present the metrics adopted for the evaluation of the
proposed IDS architecture.
1. Detection Rate. We define the detection rate as the number of true positive detections
of malicious nodes over the total number of malicious nodes in the network.
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Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(5)
2. Communication Overhead. We define the communication overhead as the additional
volume of data communication introduced in the network as a result of the operation
of the IDS. We follow the practice of [27] and monitor this metric only to the 1-
hop neighbouring nodes of the Sink (the rationale is that any network tra c will
have to go through these nodes prior to reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the
energy consumption of the said nodes with the IDS running and with EIDS the energy





3. Total Energy Consumption in the Network. We measure the total energy consumption
 Etot   in the network as the di↵erence between the total available energy in the
network at the beginning of a simulation and at the end. We denote the initial available
energy for sensor   by E 
init
and the initial available energy for sensor   by E 
final
. Then,




(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 11: Detection rate over IDS agent nodes failures
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 12: Detection rate after IDS agents failure recovery
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(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 13: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by the IDS with recovery mecha-
nism
5.3. Simulation Findings
Figure 7a shows that in sparse networks the detection rate remains as high as 85% for the
scenarios where 100% and 80% of the node population operates as an IDS agent. However,
the detection rate drops at 60% for 60% of the population as IDS agents, and continues to
drop further as the percentage of the agents is reduced. This demonstrates that the IDS
performance in sparse networks quickly drops due to the fact that areas of the network
remain un-monitored. We note, however, that there is a certain level of resilience for high
percentages of IDS agents.
Figure 7b shows the findings for networks of normal density. We note two points. Firstly,
the IDS demonstrates a greater degree of resilience as it achieves high detection rates even
for percentages of IDS agents as low as 40% of the node population. Second, we note
that for 100% of nodes as IDS agents the simulation was not completed due to the fact
that the network was rendered disconnected as the motes lying close to the Sink were not
able to handle the increased network tra c. This highlights the network strain that even
light-weight IDSs introduce.
This could also form the reason why other works in the literature on IoT and WSAN
IDS limit their simulation studies in networks with small populations. Figure 7c further
highlights these findings as the simulations failed to complete for scenarios considering big
numbers of IDS agents (percentages of 100% and 80%). Also, in dense networks the detection
rate of the IDS remained at very high levels (circa 80%-85%).
At this point we make another important observation. For all three network densities,
the detection rate of the IDS starts to deteriorate significantly (and as shown in 7a, pro-
portionally to the reduction in IDS agents percentage) once the absolute number of IDS
agents in the network drops below a constant threshold, in this case below 25 IDS nodes
(corresponding to 80% of the population for sparse networks, %60 of the population for
medium dense networks, %20 of the population for dense networks). This implies that only
a constant number of IDS agents is needed to e↵ectively and e ciently monitor the network.
This is a very strong indication that the e ciency of hybrid/distributed IDS for peer-
to-peer ad-hoc networks is independent of the number of nodes but related to underlying
fundamental properties of the network. Following our network modelling with the use of
Random Geometric Graphs, we conjecture that this property is the size of the minimum
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vertex cover of the corresponding RGG instance. We intend to investigate this in our future
work employing more formal and rigorous methods from graph theory.
Figures 9 and 10 show that the energy consumption and the communication overhead
introduced to the network by the IDS is proportional to the number of nodes operating as
IDS agents. This shows the massive gains that can be achieved with respect to fine-tuning
the trade-o↵ between energy e ciency and the achieved high detection rate as a result of
using a constant number of IDS agents.
In the second part of our experiments we initially dropped o↵ gradually and randomly
some IDS agent nodes during the simulation to study the resilience and how that a↵ects
the e ciency of our approach. We then evaluated the proposed IDS algorithm deployed
at the monitoring agents against node failures. Figures 11 show for the varying network
densities the detection rates remain systematically high for all scenarios of the di↵erent
IDS agent numbers (25,23,21). That is, even if the number of IDS agents drops slightly
below the connectivity threshold (which is equal to 25 in this case), the e↵ectiveness and
performance of the IDS is not significantly a↵ected. For even lower numbers (19 to 17
IDS agents) the detection rates would drop gradually and gracefully a↵ecting only areas
of the networks left un-monitored. This indicates that the IDS agents placement based
on the threshold connectivity provides a level of resilience against nodes failure, but it is
not guaranteed with more node failures. It is therefore proposed to introduce and include
lightweight processes and algorithms to monitor IDS agents against nodes failure. Figure 12
shows that the detection rate after activating the resilience mechanism integrated with the
proposed architecture as shown in algorithm 2 remains high even after the nodes dropping.
This indicates that our approach provides a level of resilience against nodes failures or
whenever nodes fail to communicate with the central IDS.
Figure 13 shows the energy consumption and the communication overhead introduced
into the network by our proposed algorithm that monitors the distributed IDS agents against
nodes failure. The energy consumption is not a↵ected after random IDS agents nodes
dropping due to that centralised IDS reallocate the distributed IDS agents in order to recover
the area that left un-monitored.
This indicates that the energy e ciency of hybrid IDS architecture for ad-hoc networks
is independent to the number of nodes acting as IDS agents and their placement. It su ces
that only one of neighbouring nodes monitors and reports relevant information to the Sink.
Thus, it reduces the number of nodes that are needed to operate as IDS agents.
6. Future Work
In this work detection accuracy was outside the scope of the research. We investigates
the underline cause of the communication and energy consumption overhead introduce to
constrained networks by an IDS. In particular, study the communication overheads intro-
duced by hybrid IDS and seek to optimise the trade-o↵ between energy e ciency of IDS and
detection rate. We consider the IDS architecture and the IDS agents placement strategies
regardless of the detection accuracy.We propose a novel IDS architecture that requires only
a subset of the nodes with proper placement to e ciently operate distributed IDS agents.
19
Further studies should be conducted to enhance the accuracy of detection algorithm that we
used with proposed IDS architecture. For instance, we consider in conducted experiments
for this research sinkhole attack on RPL routing protocol for constrained networks as an
attacker model. Sinkhole attack is an insider attack were an attacker compromises a node
inside the network and launches an attack. The malicious node in this attack advertises a
beneficial path in order to attract its neighbour nodes to route the tra c through it based
on the routing metric as specified by the routing protocol. The existing detection algorithm
we used on proposed IDS architecture achieved high detection rates. However, further work
is certainly required to improve the detection accuracy of this detection algorithm and also
an extension is required to detect other attacks on other routing protocols.
The IDS architecture for WSNs proposed in this work can be extended and consider
mobile Wireless Networks. In the proposed approach we considered static ad-hoc Wireless
Sensor Networks. We provide a formal model for WSNs with the use of Random Geo-
metric Graphs; a graph-theoretical model that properly captures the spatial characteristics
of WSNs such as inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring
nodes. Future research should be conducted to investigate the novel findings of this work on
Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs) that are used recently in critical settings and
real-world applications. MWSN share the following characteristics of IoT and WSN: their
highly distributed nature; their ad-hoc network structure; the peer-to-peer communication
scheme among the devices; the highly constrained nature of the devices per se in terms of
resources (computational power, available energy, limited memory, etc). Moreover, MWSN
are characterised by their mobility feature that adds more challenging on Wireless Networks
security solutions. Therefore, future research should be conducted to study standardised
routing protocols of mobile Wireless Networks.
Furthermore, we intend to employ rigorous graph-theoretical methods and tools to for-
mally prove proposed approach for real-world networks. We will also work in providing
e cient algorithms for choosing in a distributed way which nodes should operate as IDS
agents as well as balancing this role among all the nodes.
7. Conclusions
In this work we study e cient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems for static
ad-hoc networks via the prism of IPv6-enabled Wireless Actuator Sensor Networks. We
first provide a formal model for WSNs with the use of Random Geometric Graphs, a graph-
theoretical model to capture the spatial characteristics of WSNs such as inter-dependencies
on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes. Then, motivated from the
operation of IoT-specific networking protocols such as RPL, we focus on network attacks
such as the sinkhole or man-in-the-middle. We identify and try to optimise the trade-o↵
between energy e ciency and communication overhead on one hand, and the IDS detection
rate on the other. By levering upon the distributed nature of such protocols and locally
available network information.
We extend the state of the art on IDS for WSNs by integrating our method and conduct
our performance evaluation via extensive emulations. We consider various network densities
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(as these are formally defined via the RGG model) and show that 1) indeed the IDS detection
rates remain at very high levels (around 85%) even with a subset of the nodes as IDS
agents; 2) that the required number of IDS agents in the network in order to achieve these
levels is independent from the network population and in fact constant ; 3) that the energy
consumption and communication overhead introduced by the IDS is proportional to the
number of IDS agents, therefore our method allows for massive energy gains while not
a↵ecting the detection rate of the IDS. Furthermore, results show that our proposed IDS
architecture is resilient and robust against node failures. Centralised IDS monitors the
distributed IDS agents and reallocates a new subset to run as IDS agents whenever node
failure accrue.
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